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Abstract
The strategic closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) literature makes the assumption that a consumer’s
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a remanufactured product is a fraction of his/her WTP for the cor-
responding new product, and this fraction, called discount factor, is assumed to be constant among
consumers. Recent empirical research challenges this assumption, by showing that there is consider-
able variability in discount factors among consumers. This paper considers a complex model in the
CLSC literature: strategic remanufacturing under quality choice, and compares its solution under
constant discount factors with the solution that assumes a probability distribution for the discount
factors (which is analytically intractable and must be obtained numerically). We consider quality
choice and remanufacturing for both monopoly and competitive cases. Overall, we find remarkable
consistency between the results of the constant and variable discount factor models. Thus, we make
a convincing argument that the constant discount factor assumption is robust and can be used due
to its tractability.
Keywords: Strategic planning, remanufacturing, game theory, closed-loop supply chains
1. Introduction
Remanufacturing is the process of restoring a used product to a common aesthetic and operating
standard (Lund, 1984). In many cases, products remanufactured by an original equipment manu-
facturer (OEM) are essentially like-new (e.g., Ferguson and Souza, 2010). However, the empirical
closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) literature convincingly demonstrates that, in general, consumers’
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for remanufactured products are lower than for new products, and this is
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: rainer.kleber@ovgu.de (Rainer Kleber), marc.reimann@uni-graz.at (Marc Reimann),
gsouza@indiana.edu (Gilvan C. Souza), weihua.zhang@uni-graz.at (Weihua Zhang)
Preprint submitted to European Journal of Operational Research January 10, 2018
*Manuscript
Click here to download Manuscript: Paper_robustness_study_v5b.tex Click here to view linked References
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
reflected in lower prices for remanufactured products (for a review, see Souza, 2013). For example,
Guide and Li (2010) auction new and remanufactured power tools and Internet routers on eBay,
with fulfillment by the respective OEMs, and with the same warranty as new products. They find
that the final auction price for remanufactured products is 15% lower than for their corresponding
new counterparts. As another example, Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012) compare prices of
new and remanufactured products at eBay, and find that price discounts for remanufactured prod-
ucts, after controlling for warranty, range between 15% and 40% for different types of consumer
electronics. The drivers of this lower WTP have been investigated in the recent CLSC literature,
and are related to lower perceived quality, as we further discuss in section 2.
Because consumers’ WTP for remanufactured products are generally lower than their WTP
for corresponding new products, OEMs that offer remanufactured products must carefully price
new and remanufactured products to maximize profitability. This is because the addition of a
remanufactured product to an OEM’s product line has a positive market expansion effect, but also
a negative cannibalization effect, and prices of remanufactured and new products determine the
magnitude of these effects (see, e.g., Souza, 2013). Pricing is also critical for an OEM to deter
competition from independent remanufacturers (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006). The literature has
analyzed these and other strategic CLSC problems, as discussed in section 2, using analytic models.
In these models, the classical approach to model a consumer’s WTP for remanufactured products is
to multiply her WTP for corresponding new products by a discount factor, as follows. Consumers
are characterized by their WTP for a new product, denoted by θ; consumers are heterogeneous and
θ ∼ U [0, 1]. A customer of type θ has a WTP δθ for the remanufactured unit, where δ ≤ 1 is the
discount factor (also called durability level by some authors), assumed constant across consumers.
As shown in section 3, assuming that the discount factor δ is constant across consumers results
in linear demand curves for new and remanufactured products, which is tractable for analyzing
strategic CLSC problems.
Abbey et al. (2017), however, find that consumers differ significantly in their discount factors
for remanufactured products. They empirically derive a probability distribution of discount factors
for the iPhone 6, whose cumulative density function (cdf) is plotted in Figure 1, along with a
truncated normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation (the smooth curve in
Figure 1), which demonstrates a good fit. They also assess the impact of this variable discount
2
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Figure 1: The empirical CDF and the corresponding CDF of the truncated normal distribution
factor finding on the simplest analytical model of the CLSC literature—whether a monopolist OEM
should offer a remanufactured product, in addition to its new product. Their analysis considers
the solutions under constant and variable discount factor assumptions. They show that the general
insights provided by the model with constant discount factors hold under variable discount factors
in this simple model. Thus, their paper provides initial evidence of the robustness of the constant
discount factor assumption.
The major contribution of this paper is to show the robustness of the constant discount factor
assumption for significantly more complex strategic models in the CLSC literature: the models—
both monopoly and competition—where quality choice for the new product is also a decision variable
by the firm(s), in addition to prices of new and remanufactured products. This is because, as we
see in section 3.1, equation (1), a model with quality choice results in non-linear demand curves for
new and remanufactured products, even under a constant discount factor assumption. Despite these
analytical challenges, the quality choice model under constant discount factors has been analyzed
by Atasu and Souza (2013) for the monopolist OEM, whereas competition against an independent
remanufacturer (IR) has been analyzed by Örsdemir et al. (2014). We analyze quality choice models
for both a monopolist OEM, and OEM competition against an IR under variable discount factors,
and compare the findings against those with constant discount factors from Örsdemir et al. (2014).
To further demonstrate robustness, we consider two significant extensions: (i) when there is a
convex collection cost (for both monopoly and competition), and (ii) when both the OEM and IR
offer remanufactured products, in addition to the new product by the OEM. There is some empirical
evidence that unit collection costs increase in the quantity collected in some settings (Atasu et al.,
2013); hence our proposed extension. Second, there are several industry scenarios where both the
OEM and IR offer remanufactured products (Souza, 2013). The models with variable discount
3
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factors are analytically intractable—even the demand functions cannot be obtained in closed form,
as we show in section 3.2, equations (7)-(8)—and must thus be solved numerically.
We find that the constant discount factor model is reasonably robust in generating valid qual-
itative insights in this complex setting. For example, there is consistency in how optimal and/or
equilibrium prices and quality behave as a function of parameter values, such as unit costs, and
mean discount factors. We find, of course, (relatively small) differences in the actual optimal values
of prices and quality between constant and variable discount factor models. One additional insight
brought by the variable discount model is that a firm (either OEM or IR) remanufactures under a
much wider set of remanufacturing costs and discount factors, because for a given remanufactured
product price that is less than the new product price, there is always a non-zero segment of con-
sumers who are willing to buy the remanufactured product. This result holds for both monopoly
and competition settings. Despite the differences in optimal and/or equilibrium prices between
the two models, we remind the reader that the purpose of stylized models is not to provide ac-
tual decision support for firms in making pricing decisions, but rather to offer qualitative insights
into strategic behavior. Thus, we provide convincing evidence that the tractable constant discount
factor assumption is robust for use in stylized models for generating insights.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a literature review. In section 3
we briefly describe the analytic model by Örsdemir et al. (2014) for both the monopolist OEM
case, as well as when the OEM competes with an IR. We then describe how the models change
under variable discount factors. In section 4, we describe our experimental design and the numerical
solution approach. In section 5, we provide the numerical results for the monopolist OEM comparing
both constant and variable discount factor models. In section 6, we provide the comparison for the
case where the OEM competes with an IR. In section 7.1, we consider the extension with convex
collection costs, for both monopoly, and OEM competition with an IR. In section 7.2, we consider
the extension where both OEM and IR offer remanufactured products, in addition to the OEM’s
new product. We conclude in section 8.
2. Literature Review
OEMs remanufacture for such reasons as value recovery, product line extension, use for war-
ranty fulfillment, and brand protection against independent remanufacturers (see, e.g., Atasu et al.,
4
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2010, Ferguson and Souza, 2010). These reasons led to a significant stream of normative CLSC
research on an OEM’s decision to remanufacture, including optimal pricing under competition (e.g.,
Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001, Debo et al., 2005, Ferguson and Toktay, 2006, Ferrer and Swami-
nathan, 2006), marketing strategies (e.g., Atasu et al., 2008, Oraiopoulos et al., 2012), impact of
remanufacturing on new product quality and design (Atasu and Souza, 2013, Galbreth et al., 2013,
Subramanian et al., 2013, Örsdemir et al., 2014), strategic product acquisition (Guide et al., 2003),
and production capacity (Vorasayan and Ryan, 2006). This research assumes constant discount
factors, which results in tractable linear demand curves as we see in the next section.
Recent behavioral CLSC research empirically scrutinizes this constant discount factor assump-
tion. Ovchinnikov (2011) finds that WTP for remanufactured products decrease if remanufactured
products are priced too low, due to a low-quality perception. Ovchinnikov et al. (2014) empirically
derive demand functions, using conjoint analysis, that are not linear. Agrawal et al. (2015) show
how remanufacturing by an OEM is perceived differently by consumers than remanufacturing by an
IR. Abbey et al. (2015) use consumer experiments to obtain the attractiveness of remanufactured
products as a function of price discounts, brand equity, and quality perceptions. For technology
products, they find that under low discount levels the attractiveness of remanufactured products in-
creases with an increasing discount level, confirming theoretical predictions. Yet, they also find that
too high price discounts may decrease the attractiveness of remanufactured products, in line with
Ovchinnikov (2011). Finally, Abbey et al. (2017) empirically derive the probability distribution of
discount factors for a remanufactured iPhone 6.
This paper contributes to the CLSC literature by showing that the insights provided by the
quality choice model of Örsdemir et al. (2014), which is arguably the most complex analytic model
in the literature using the constant discount factor assumption, carry over to the (realistic) situation
where discount factors are variable; we use the empirically-derived discount factor distribution of
Abbey et al. (2017) as the basis of our analysis. In addition, we provide two significant extensions.
First, we consider convex collection costs, which has been shown to hold empirically by Atasu et al.
(2013) in some settings. Second, we consider the case where both the OEM and IR offer reman-
ufactured products, in addition to the OEM’s new product. This latter extension is analytically
challenging even with constant discount factors. As a result, only simplified versions of it without
quality as a decision variable have been analyzed analytically (e.g., Atasu et al., 2008, Ferrer and
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Swaminathan, 2006), or the model has been analyzed numerically (Örsdemir et al., 2014).
3. Analytic model
3.1. Quality choice under constant discount factor for remanufactured products
We first briefly describe the benchmark quality choice model by Örsdemir et al. (2014); we refer
to their paper for additional details. The notation is shown in Table 1. In their model, which is
based on long-standing marketing literature (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978, Moorthy, 1988), quality is
modeled as a single, continuous decision variable s, which indicates a critical performance dimension
for which consumers are willing to pay for, such as megapixels in a digital camera.
Table 1: Notation
Parameters
α unit cost for the remanufactured product as a fraction of the new product’s unit cost
β scaling parameter in the unit cost
Decision variables
pn price of the new product
pr price of the remanufactured product
s quality level
Auxiliary variables
θ WTP for the new product with unit quality level
δ discount factor for WTP for remanufactured products
qn quantity of new products
qr quantity of remanufactured products
θab a consumer type that is indifferent between alternatives a and b
Monopolist OEM. If the OEM provides a new product with quality s at price pn, then the net
utility that a consumer of type θ ∼ U [0, 1] derives from this product is Un(θ) = θs−pn, where θ
is interpreted as WTP of a consumer for a product with unit quality level. Thus, if only the new
product is available the sales quantity given a unit market size is qn = 1·Pr{θs−pn≥ 0}= 1− pns ,
where the last equality results from the uniform distribution for θ. A customer of type θ has a
WTP δθ for the remanufactured unit, where δ≤1 is the discount factor, assumed constant across
consumers. Note that, as defined, a higher discount factor δ means that consumers consider the
remanufactured product more similar to the new product. Thus, a consumer of type θ has a net
utility for the remanufactured product priced at pr equal to Ur(θ) = δθs−pr. Equating Un(θ) and
Ur(θ) results in the consumer θrn = pn−pr(1−δ)s that is indifferent between the two products. Likewise,
setting Ur(θ) = 0 results in the consumer θzr = prδs that is indifferent between buying a remanufac-
6
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tured product and buying nothing. With the uniform distribution for θ, this yields:
qn(pn, pr, s) = 1− pn − pr
(1− δ)s and qr(pn, pr, s) =
pn − pr
(1− δ)s −
pr
δs
. (1)
Note that, if the quality s is normalized to one, as in a significant portion of the CLSC literature,
then (1), which originate from the assumption of a constant discount factor δ across consumers,
result in linear demand curves; this ensures tractability. When the quality choice s is a decision
variable, then the demand curves are non-linear in s.
Following the literature on quality choice, the unit cost for the new product is convex increasing
in the quality level, βs2, whereas the unit cost for the remanufactured product, including the cost
of collecting a used product, is a fraction α of the unit cost of the new product, αβs2. The monop-
olist OEM first selects the optimal quality of the product s∗. It then determines the prices of new
and remanufactured products to optimize its profit in a single period. In the CLSC literature, one
period is the length of the product’s life with consumers, after which it must be remanufactured
to be useful again. Considering a stationary setting, the period in the model can be thought of
a period in an infinite planning horizon with identical periods. The price choices are constrained
in such a way that the quantity of remanufactured products cannot exceed the quantity of new
products because used products, or cores, are the key input for remanufacturing as follows. Since
a new product lasts one period, a used product in a period corresponds to a new product sold in
the previous period; considering the infinite-horizon setting with identical periods, qn is the same
in all periods, hence the constraint qr ≤ qn. Another possibility for such core availability constraint
would be to set qr ≤ τqn, where τ < 1 indicates that not all used products can be recovered. We use
the constraint qr ≤ qn in order to directly compare our results with those of Örsdemir et al. (2014).
Incorporating the additional parameter τ would increase the region where total remanufacturing
(i.e., the core availability constraint is tight) is optimal, but would not change the key insights about
the robustness of the constant discount factor model. To solve this problem, backward induction is
used. First, the OEM solves the pricing optimization problem for a given quality level s:
max
pn,pr|s
pi(pn, pr, s) = (pn − βs2)qn(pn, pr, s) + (pr − αβs2)qr(pn, pr, s), (2)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr(pn, pr, s) ≤ qn(pn, pr, s).
Then, the OEM solves for the optimal quality level, given the optimal prices:
max
s≥0
pi(p∗n(s), p
∗
r(s), s), (3)
7
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where p∗n(s) and p∗r(s) are the optimal prices (as a function of the quality level s) found in (2). The
closed-form solution to problem (1)-(3) can be found in Örsdemir et al. (2014).
Competition between OEM and IR. Now, the OEM offers only new products, whereas the IR offers
a remanufactured version of the OEM’s product. The OEM first chooses the quality level of the
new product. Then, for a given quality level, the OEM and IR compete by choosing the new and
remanufactured product prices, respectively, under the core availability constraint. The OEM and
IR make simultaneous pricing moves, as assumed by Örsdemir et al. (2014), and this is also consis-
tent with other competition models in the CLSC literature. This results in a game, which can be
solved by backward induction, as follows. First, the OEM and IR solve the following pricing game:
max
pn|pr,s
piOEM (pn, pr, s) = (pn − βs2) · qn(pn, pr, s), (4)
s.t. qn(pn, pr, s) ≥ 0.
max
pr|pn,s
piIR(pr|s, pn) = (pr − αβs2) · qr(pn, pr, s), (5)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr(pn, pr, s) ≤ qn(pn, pr, s).
The OEM then chooses the optimal quality s∗ that maximizes its profit:
max
s≥0
piOEM (p
∗
n(s), p
∗
r(s), s). (6)
The game comprised of (1) and (4)-(6) has a closed-form Nash equilibrium solution, given by Örs-
demir et al. (2014). Although other equilibria are possible in a multi-period game, the equilibrium
solution to the above model corresponds to a stationary equilibrium in an infinite-horizon setting
with identical periods, which is standard in the CLSC literature (Souza, 2013).
3.2. Quality choice under variable discount factor for remanufactured products
Under a variable discount factor, δ is no longer constant, but has a probability distribution with
cdf F (·), such as the one shown in Figure 1, with support [0, 1]; denote the probability density
function of δ as f(·). A consumer can then be described as a point (θ, δ) in the respective plane.
The starting point from the derivation of the demand functions is similar to the constant discount
factor model. In particular, we equate the utility of buying a new product Un(θ) = θs−pn to
the utility of buying a remanufactured product Ur(θ, δ) = δθs−pr to yield the indifference curve
θrn =
pn−pr
(1−δ)s . Likewise, we equate the utility of buying a remanufactured product Ur(θ, δ) to the
utility of buying nothing Uz = 0, yielding the indifference curve θzr = prδs . Finally, we equate the
utility of buying a new product Un(θ) to that of buying nothing Uz, yielding θzn= pns .
8
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Figure 2: Consumer behavior depending in θ and δ
Figure 2 graphically depicts the consumer regions for buying new products (N), buying re-
manufactured products (R), and not buying (Z) in the plane (θ, δ). Each shaded region (e.g.,
N) characterizes the consumer types (θ, δ) who have higher utility for that alternative (i.e., the
new product) than for the other alternatives (i.e., the remanufactured product, and nothing). As
a result, demand functions for new and remanufactured products are the double integrals of the
probability distributions of consumer types θ and δ over the respective regions, as follows:
qn(pn, pr, s) =
∫ pr/pn
0
f(δ) dδ
∫ 1
θzn
dθ +
∫ 1−(pn−pr)/s
pr/pn
f(δ)
∫ 1
θrn
dθ dδ, (7)
qr(pn, pr, s) =
∫ 1
pr/pn
f(δ)
∫ 1
θzr
dθ dδ −
∫ 1−(pn−pr)/s
pr/pn
f(δ)
∫ 1
θrn
dθ dδ. (8)
The first term in (7) corresponds to the rectangle formed by θ values between θzn and 1, and δ values
between 0 and prpn , where the latter is the intersection of the curves θzn and θrn. The second term in
(7) corresponds to the area formed by θ values between the curve θrn and 1, and δ values between
pr
pn
(the intersection of the curves θzn and θrn) and 1− pn−prs , where the latter is the intersection of
the curve θrn and θ=1. The first term in (8) corresponds to the area formed by θ values between
the curve θzr and 1, and δ values between prpn (the intersection of the curves θzr and θrn) and 1.
The second term in (8) is the area related to the second term in (7).
Although a closed-form solution to (7) and (8) is possible for a simple continuous distribution
of δ, such as the uniform, there is no closed-form solution when δ follows a (truncated) normal
9
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distribution, such as the one in Figure 1, which shows a good empirical fit.1 Thus, the demand
curves must be derived numerically: for each possible triple (pn, pr, s), the integrals in (7)-(8) are
computed numerically to generate the corresponding qn(pn, pr, s) and qr(pn, pr, s).
Now, in the monopolist OEM case, the OEM solves the optimization model consisting of (7), (8)
and (2)-(3). In the case where the OEM competes with the IR, the equilibrium is found by solving
(7), (8), and (4)–(6). Given the fact that the demand functions themselves (7) and (8) cannot be
found in closed-form, the respective solution and equilibrium need to be found numerically. We
describe the experimental design and solution procedure for our numerical analysis next.
4. Experimental design and numerical solution approach
Experimental design. The numerical study consists of two parts, namely the case of the monop-
olist OEM, and the case of competition between the OEM and the IR. We consider a truncated
normal distribution for the discount factor, following its good fit with the empirical discount factor
distribution found by Abbey et al. (2017) for the iPhone 6, and shown in Figure 1. To analyze
the impact of different values of E[δ], as well as the impact of different levels of variability in the
distribution of δ, we consider five truncated normal distributions: truncated N(0.3, 0.12), trun-
cated N(0.6, 0.22), truncated N(0.3, 0.052), truncated N(0.6, 0.12), and truncated N(0.8, (0.86 )
2).
The five curves provide three different levels of E[δ], namely 0.3, 0.6, and 0.8, and two levels of
variability, with coefficients of variation (CV) equal to 1/3 and 1/6. In addition, we also consider
the benchmark constant discount factor, that is, a CV of zero. Essentially, we use the minimum
and maximum values of 0.3 and 0.8 for E[δ] in our design because they still allow us to use a trun-
cated normal distribution with reasonable values of variability, considering that the distribution of
discount factors has a support in [0,1]. In fact, for E[δ] = 0.8, the CV value of 1/3 is not possible
with a truncated normal distribution. We emphasize that the truncated normal distribution for δ
has empirical support, as shown in Figure 1 (Abbey et al., 2017). Furthermore, we are not aware
of any remanufactured product that sells with discounts higher than 70% relative to the price of a
comparable new product; reported price discounts in the literature range between 15% and 55 %
(Subramanian and Subramanyam, 2012, Hauser and Lund, 2003), and hence values for E[δ] below
1Abbey et al. (2017) show that even in case of a uniform δ distribution, demand functions are non-linear and
optimal solutions for the simple monopolist OEM model without quality choice can only be derived numerically.
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0.3 are unlikely to happen in practice. We present mainly the results for E[δ] = 0.6 (as the results
for E[δ] = 0.3 and E[δ] = 0.8 are similar), except where we report on the behavior of the solution
with respect to E[δ]. We select E[δ] = 0.6 to report most of the results, because it is similar to the
value found by Abbey et al. (2017) for the remanufactured iPhone 6, which is E[δ] = 0.57.
In terms of unit cost for the new product, we normalize β = 1, as in Örsdemir et al. (2014).
For the remanufactured product’s unit cost as a fraction α of the new product’s unit cost, which
is necessarily less than one, we consider a wide range of possible values: α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}.
Henceforth, we refer to α simply as the relative unit cost of the remanufactured product.
For each of the above eight distributions for δ (including the constant δ case), and the nine
possible values of α, we analyze both the monopolist OEM and competition with IR cases. The
experimental design thus yields 8 · 9 · 2 = 144 experimental cells. For each cell, we compute the
benchmark solution of Örsdemir et al. (2014) (under constant discount factors), and the numerical
solution under variable discount factors.
Numerical solution approach for monopoly case. For any given value of the quality level s, and
considering the well-behaved objective function (2), we approximate the optimal price combination
(p∗n, p∗r) by combining an eight-directional local search procedure with a best-improvement strategy.
A step size of 10−6 was used to ensure sufficient precision. The initial feasible solution was found
with a grid search on a coarse 200x200 grid of prices. For determining the optimal quality level we
then performed a grid search over the range of s ∈ (0, 1) to ensure a precision of three digits.
Numerical solution approach for competition between OEM and IR. For a given quality level s, we
find the equilibrium prices by applying a two-stage process. First we converted the game (4) and
(5) into a matrix game on a coarse grid of prices pn and pr and solved it (see, e.g., Belleflamme
and Peitz, 2015). Then, we iteratively changed pn (to improve piOEM ) and pr (to increase piIR) by
local search to better approximate the intersection point of the best-response functions. For this
purpose, we applied a step size of 10−6. We then determined the quality level s that maximizes
piOEM by performing a grid search over the range s ∈ (0, 1) to ensure a precision of three digits.
5. Numerical results: monopolist OEM
In this section, we consider the monopolist OEM’s case. We adopt the superscript “F” (for
“forecast”) to denote the values of variables obtained by solving the benchmark constant discount
11
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Table 2: Production strategy regions
production strategy regions for
α E[δ] = 0.3 E[δ] = 0.6 E[δ] = 0.8
CV= 1
3
CV= 1
6
CV= 0 CV= 1
3
CV= 1
6
CV= 0 CV= 1
6
CV= 0
0.1 P P P T T T T T
0.2 P P P T T T T T
0.3 P P N T T T T T
0.4 P N N P P P T T
0.5 N N N P P P T T
0.6 N N N P P N T T
0.7 N N N P P N P P
0.8 N N N P N N P N
0.9 N N N P N N P N
factor model, and the superscript “opt” to denote the variable value obtained by solving the model
with variable discount factors. The following formatting rule is applicable to all figures in our
paper: When “CV = 16 ” appears in the legend, it denotes the corresponding results obtained from
cases where the discount factor follows the truncated N(0.6, 0.12) distribution; “CV = 13 ” indicates
that the discount factor follows the truncated N(0.6, 0.22) distribution, and “Const. δ” indicates
the benchmark constant discount factor model with δ = 0.6. In addition, solutions to the variable
discount factor model are plotted with solid lines while solutions to the benchmark constant discount
factor model are plotted with dashed lines.
5.1. Monopoly: Comparison between constant and variable discount factor solutions
Let (sF∗, pF∗n , pF∗r ) denote the solution for the benchmark model that assumes constant discount
factors, and (sopt∗, popt∗n , popt∗r ) denote the solution for the model with variable discount factors.
5.1.1. Comparison of production strategy regions
Table 2 displays the production strategy regions for both constant and variable discount factor
models. We use “T”, “P” and “N” to respectively denote the scenarios of total remanufacturing
(q∗r = q∗n), partial remanufacturing (q∗r < q∗n), and no remanufacturing (q∗r = 0). Under constant
discount factors, Örsdemir et al. (2014) show that the monopolist OEM remanufactures if α < δ,
which is shown in Table 2 in the CV= 0 columns. Under variable discount factors, we defined no
remanufacturing when qr < 0.0001 which is a precision of our numerical results. From Table 2, it
is clear that remanufacturing (either partial or total) is optimal for a wider range of cost values α
under variable discount factors. For example, consider E[δ] = 0.6. Under constant discount factors
12
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Figure 3: Impact of α on optimal prices pn (left) and pr (right) in the monopoly case (E[δ] = 0.6, CV= 13 )
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Figure 4: Impact of α on optimal quality level s (left) and profit pi (right) in the monopoly case (E[δ] = 0.6, CV= 1
3
)
(CV = 0), remanufacturing is not optimal for α ≥ 0.6, however, remanufacturing is always optimal
when CV = 1/3.
5.1.2. Comparison of optimal values
Figure 3 plots the optimal prices at different levels of α for the two different models. The
optimal price for the remanufactured product is always higher under variable discount factors than
under the benchmark constant discount factor model. Note that in Figure 3 (right), there are no
values for pFr plotted for α ≥ 0.6, because remanufacturing is not optimal under the benchmark
model if α ≥ δ. As a result, for α ≥ 0.6, the optimal new product prices are similar across models.
The optimal quality levels in Figure 4 (left) have a similar behavior as the new product prices,
for both models. This is expected in the constant discount factor model, as Örsdemir et al. (2014)
show that p∗n is a quadratic function of s∗; we show here that this strong correlation between p∗n and
s∗ also carries over to the variable discount factor model. Finally, Figure 4 (right) indicates that
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the profit piopt decreases monotonically with α under variable discount factors, as remanufacturing
always occurs in this case, and profits decrease as the volume of remanufacturing decreases due to
higher unit costs. Under the benchmark constant discount factor model, the (forecasted) profit piF
decreases, as expected, with α until no-remanufacturing becomes optimal.
5.2. Comparison of profits achieved by the solutions proposed by the two models
In this subsection, we compare the actual profits that result from adopting the solutions from the
two models. To find the impact of using the benchmark solution, computed under the assumption
of constant discount factors, on actual (not forecast) profit, consider that the OEM (mistakenly)
assumes constant discount factors, and uses the benchmark model to compute (sF∗, pF∗n , pF∗r ). We
then find the OEM’s actual profit piRB from using this solution in a world with variable discount
factors. More precisely, piRB is the profit computed using the solution (sF∗, pF∗n , pF∗r ), but with the
appropriate demand functions (7) and (8). The comparisons of the two solutions are displayed for all
values of E[δ] and CV in Table 3, where we also include columns for the percent differences between
the decision variables of the two models. That is, we also report on the percent deviations, defined
as: ∆s∗=100%· sF∗−sopt∗sopt∗ , ∆p∗n=100%· p
F∗
n −popt∗n
popt∗n
, ∆p∗r=100%· p
F∗
r −popt∗r
popt∗r
, and ∆Π∗=100%·ΠRB∗−Πopt∗Πopt∗ .
Thus, the absolute value of ∆Π∗ is the loss in profit when using the benchmark model as a heuristic
to set optimal quality levels and prices. From Table 3 we point out the following: (i) The absolute
percent differences in remanufactured product prices are almost always considerably higher than the
absolute percent differences in new product prices; (ii) the absolute percent differences in quality
levels move in the same direction as the percent differences in new product prices; and (iii) the
absolute percent differences in profits almost always decrease in α and increase in E[δ]. Overall,
however, the results point to consistency between constant and variable discount factor models.
6. Numerical results: competition between the OEM and an IR
We now turn our attention to the numerical results for the case where the OEM competes with
an IR: The OEM offers new products, whereas the IR offers remanufactured products.
6.1. Competition: Comparison between constant and variable discount factor solutions
Comparison of equilibrium regions. Under constant discount factors, Örsdemir et al. (2014) show
the existence of four types of equilibria, depending on the ratio α/δ. Specifically, in decreasing
14
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Table 3: Comparison of differences in decision making in the monopoly case
E(δ) CV α sopt∗ popt∗n popt∗r piopt∗ sF∗ pF∗n pF∗r piRB ∆s∗(%) ∆p∗n(%) ∆p∗r(%) ∆Π∗(%)
0.3 1/3 0.1 0.37 0.25 0.08 0.038 0.38 0.26 0.06 0.038 2.4 3.3 -15.9 -2.0
0.3 1/3 0.2 0.34 0.23 0.08 0.037 0.34 0.23 0.06 0.036 -0.1 0.0 -25.4 -3.3
0.3 1/3 0.3 0.34 0.22 0.10 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -0.5 -0.6 – -0.2
0.3 1/3 0.4 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -0.2 -0.2 – > -0.1
0.6 1/3 0.1 0.53 0.39 0.24 0.053 0.49 0.34 0.18 0.040 -9.0 -12.9 -24.3 -24.1
0.6 1/3 0.2 0.49 0.36 0.22 0.049 0.44 0.31 0.17 0.037 -9.1 -13.1 -24.5 -24.1
0.6 1/3 0.3 0.45 0.33 0.20 0.045 0.41 0.29 0.15 0.034 -9.0 -13.0 -24.4 -24.1
0.6 1/3 0.4 0.42 0.30 0.19 0.042 0.37 0.25 0.14 0.034 -11.2 -15.9 -26.2 -19.2
0.6 1/3 0.5 0.38 0.26 0.18 0.040 0.34 0.23 0.13 0.036 -9.2 -12.5 -27.6 -9.6
0.6 1/3 0.6 0.35 0.24 0.18 0.038 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -5.8 -8.0 – -3.4
0.6 1/3 0.7 0.34 0.23 0.19 0.038 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -2.5 -3.5 – -1.6
0.6 1/3 0.8 0.34 0.23 0.20 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -1.1 -1.5 – -0.6
0.6 1/3 0.9 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -0.2 -0.3 – -0.1
0.3 1/6 0.1 0.37 0.25 0.07 0.038 0.38 0.26 0.06 0.038 2.1 3.1 -1.5 -0.2
0.3 1/6 0.2 0.34 0.23 0.07 0.037 0.34 0.23 0.06 0.037 0.5 0.8 -9.9 -0.6
0.3 1/6 0.3 0.33 0.22 0.08 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -0.2 -0.2 – > -0.1
0.6 1/6 0.1 0.50 0.36 0.20 0.049 0.49 0.34 0.18 0.043 -3.8 -5.8 -9.9 -12.0
0.6 1/6 0.2 0.46 0.33 0.18 0.045 0.44 0.31 0.17 0.040 -3.6 -5.5 -9.6 -12.0
0.6 1/6 0.3 0.43 0.30 0.17 0.042 0.41 0.29 0.15 0.037 -3.7 -5.7 -9.8 -12.0
0.6 1/6 0.4 0.38 0.27 0.16 0.039 0.37 0.25 0.14 0.038 -3.3 -4.9 -10.8 -3.2
0.6 1/6 0.5 0.35 0.24 0.15 0.038 0.34 0.23 0.13 0.037 -2.1 -2.9 -14.4 -2.2
0.6 1/6 0.6 0.34 0.23 0.16 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -1.1 -1.4 – -0.4
0.6 1/6 0.7 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -0.2 -0.3 – -0.1
0.8 1/6 0.1 0.59 0.41 0.34 0.061 0.55 0.37 0.28 0.047 -7.6 -10.2 -15.8 -23.1
0.8 1/6 0.2 0.53 0.37 0.30 0.056 0.50 0.34 0.26 0.043 -5.7 -8.5 -14.3 -23.1
0.8 1/6 0.3 0.49 0.34 0.28 0.052 0.46 0.31 0.24 0.040 -5.8 -7.6 -13.2 -23.1
0.8 1/6 0.4 0.45 0.31 0.25 0.048 0.43 0.29 0.22 0.037 -4.8 -6.6 -12.3 -23.1
0.8 1/6 0.5 0.42 0.29 0.24 0.045 0.40 0.27 0.21 0.035 -4.8 -6.9 -12.6 -23.1
0.8 1/6 0.6 0.40 0.28 0.23 0.042 0.38 0.26 0.19 0.032 -6.3 -8.9 -14.6 -23.1
0.8 1/6 0.7 0.37 0.26 0.21 0.040 0.34 0.23 0.18 0.034 -6.9 -10.1 -15.1 -15.0
0.8 1/6 0.8 0.35 0.24 0.21 0.038 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -4.8 -6.7 – -2.8
0.8 1/6 0.9 0.34 0.23 0.21 0.037 0.33 0.22 – 0.037 -2.0 -2.7 – -0.7
order of α/δ, the equilibria are as follows. R1: the IR is not a threat and thus the OEM sets
s∗ as if it were a monopolist; R2: The OEM deters the IR from entering by setting s∗ above
the monopoly level; R3: The IR conducts partial remanufacturing (qr < qn); and R4: The IR
conducts total remanufacturing (qr = qn). Table 4 displays the equilibria that occur, for both
models. As the expected discount factor E[δ] decreases, or α increases, both models predict it
to be more likely that the volume of remanufacturing by the IR decreases, from total to partial
remanufacturing. As previously discussed for the monopoly case, variability in the discount factor
δ makes remanufacturing more attractive (now, for the IR), and hence equilibrium regions R1 and
R2 (no remanufacturing) take place less often under variable discount factors.
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Table 4: Equilibrium regions
Equilibrium regions for
α E[δ] = 0.3 E[δ] = 0.6 E[δ] = 0.8
CV = 1
3
CV = 1
6
CV = 0 CV = 1
3
CV = 1
6
CV = 0 CV = 1
6
CV = 0
0.1 R3 R3 R3 R4 R4 R4 R4 R4
0.2 R3 R3 R3 R4 R4 R4 R4 R4
0.3 R3 R3 R3 R4 R4 R3 R4 R4
0.4 R3 R3 R3 R4 R3 R3 R4 R4
0.5 R3 R2 R2 R3 R3 R3 R4 R4
0.6 R2 R2 R1 R3 R3 R3 R4 R3
0.7 R2 R2 R1 R3 R3 R3 R4 R3
0.8 R2 R2 R1 R3 R3 R2 R3 R3
0.9 R2 R1 R1 R3 R3 R2 R3 R2
Comparison of equilibrium values. We now present comparisons for the equilibrium values of the
decision variables between variable and constant discount factors. Figure 5 plots the optimal quality
levels as a function of the relative unit cost of the remanufactured product α for the two models. As
discussed in the previous section, the equilibrium regions under constant discount factors change
from R4 to R3 to R2 as α increases; thus the kinks in the curves. In addition, as shown by
Örsdemir et al. (2014) under constant discount factors, the optimal quality level (also, new product
price) increases in α in equilibrium region R3, decreases in α in region R2 (a higher quality level
is necessary to deter the IR when remanufacturing is cheaper on a per unit basis), and it remains
constant with α in regions R1 (IR is not a threat) and R4 (total remanufacturing by the IR). A
similar pattern is observed under variable discount factors, except that equilibrium R2 does not
take place.
Figure 6 plots the optimal prices as a function of the relative unit cost of the remanufactured
product α for the two models. We observe from Figure 6 (left, bold lines) that, just like in the
monopoly case, the optimal new product price follows the same pattern as quality level in Figure
5 (bold lines). The remanufactured product price also follows a similar trend as the new product
price under both models. Figure 7 illustrates the corresponding equilibrium profits for the OEM
(left) and IR (right) as a function of α for both models. Both models predict that the OEM’s profit
increases in α, while the IR’s profit decreases in α, as a larger α makes the IR less competitive.
Again, there is reasonable consistency between the constant and variable discount factor models.
6.2. Comparison of profits achieved by the equilibria found by the two models
Similarly to the analysis of section 5.2, we provide here an analysis of the impact of using
the benchmark equilibrium, computed under the assumption of constant discount factors, on
16
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Figure 5: Impact of α on optimal quality level s in the competition case (E[δ] = 0.6, CV= 1
3
)
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Figure 6: Impact of α on optimal prices pn (left) and pr (right) in the competition case (E[δ] = 0.6, CV= 13 )
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Figure 7: Impact of α on optimal OEM’s (left)/IR’s (right) profit in the competition case (E[δ]=0.6, CV= 1
3
)
actual profits achieved by the OEM and IR. To that end, we compute the actual profit piRBj ,
j ∈ {OEM, IR}, that results from using the benchmark equilibrium values computed under con-
stant discount factors (sF∗, pF∗n , pF∗r ), but with the appropriate demand functions (with variable
discount factors). We then compare these values against the equilibrium values under variable
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discount factors.
Table 5 displays the results of these comparisons for all levels of E[δ] and CV. We conclude the
following. First, as E[δ] increases, the differences in prices, quality levels, and actual profits between
the two equilibria increases. When consumers find remanufactured products more attractive, it
becomes more important to correctly estimate the demand functions (through variable discount
factors) to properly price new and remanufactured products. Second, the IR usually suffers the
highest (percent) impact of incorrectly setting the prices, as its profits are lower than the OEM’s,
and hence are more sensitive to using the incorrect price. Third, there does not appear to be any
pattern regarding the percent differences in prices, quality levels, and actual profits between the
two models as the relative unit cost of the remanufactured product α increases. This is mostly
due to the changes in equilibrium types (R1, R2, R3, and R4) as α increases, as discussed in the
previous section.
7. Extensions
In this section we consider two model extensions to further strengthen the robustness of our
results. First, we consider the case of convex collection cost. Second, we model a richer case of
competition, where both the OEM and the IR can offer remanufactured products.
7.1. Convex collection cost
So far, we have abstracted from directly modeling collection costs; instead, such costs have
been (indirectly) included in the unit remanufacturing cost α. In practice, any firm willing to
remanufacture needs to exert costly effort to obtain the necessary cores. Collecting an extra unit
may become more difficult with increasing volumes of collected cores, in some settings. As an
example, a firm may have to turn to more remote consumer markets to obtain more cores when the
local market has been exhausted. To model such settings, we consider an extra convex collection
cost term −ηq2r in the objective function (2) for the monopoly case, and in (5) for the competition
case, where η is a scaling parameter. This quadratic functional form is in line with the empirical
observations by Atasu and Souza (2013) and Atasu et al. (2013) in some settings. We analyze both
constant and variable discount factors numerically, using the same experimental design of section 4,
with the additional collection cost parameter η in two levels: low (η = 0.3) and high (η = 0.7). We
report here the results for an illustrative case below; other cases have similar behavior and insights.
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Figure 8: Impact of α on optimal prices pn (left) and pr (right) in the monopoly case with convex collection costs
(E[δ] = 0.6, CV = 1
3
)
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Figure 9: Impact of α on optimal quality level s (left) and profit pi (right) in the monopoly case with convex collection
costs (E[δ] = 0.6, CV = 1
3
)
Monopoly case results. Figures 8 and 9 replicate the findings from Figures 3 and 4 for the monopolist
OEM under the two levels of collection cost. Essentially, all the findings for pn, pr, s and pi are
structurally identical to those already discussed in Section 5.1.2 for both constant and variable
discount factor models; as a result we omit the full set of results for brevity.
Competition case results. We now consider the setting where the OEM competes with an IR under
convex collection costs. Figures 10 and 11 show the impact of α on the equilibrium decisions s,
and (pn, pr), respectively, under constant and variable discount factors, for two values of η, low
and high. It is clear that the equilibrium decisions move in the same direction for both constant
and variable discount factor models, thus confirming the robustness of the constant discount factor
model. We now turn to specific insights brought upon by adding convex collection costs.
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Figure 10: Impact of α on equilibrium quality level s in the competition case with convex collection costs (E[δ] = 0.6,
CV = 1
3
)
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Figure 11: Impact of α on equilibrium prices pn (left) and pr (right) in the competition case with convex collection
costs (E[δ] = 0.6, CV = 1
3
)
In our previous analysis without convex collection costs, Figure 5 shows that the behavior of
the equilibrium quality level s is non-monotonic with respect to the unit relative remanufacturing
cost α, because there is a change in equilibrium regions from total to partial remanufacturing as α
increases, under both variable and constant discount factor models. In Figure 10, where there are
convex collection costs, quality (weakly) increases in α for both constant and variable discount factor
models. The reason is, with convex collection costs, the total remanufacturing scenario (qr = qn)
disappears for both constant and variable discount factor models. Because collection cost increases
with qr at an increasing rate, higher levels of remanufacturing become less and less attractive for
the IR. Furthermore, in the analysis without convex collection costs, the equilibrium new product
price (Figure 6, left) changes in the same direction as the equilibrium quality level (Figure 5) under
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Figure 12: Impact of α on equilibrium OEM’s profit piOEM (left) and IR’s profit piIR (right) in the competition case
with convex collection costs (E[δ] = 0.6, CV = 1
3
)
both constant and variable discount factors. This also happens under convex collection costs, as
shown in Figures 10 and 11 (left).
In Figure 6 (right), without convex collection costs, the IR does not remanufacture for α>0.7,
whereas in Figure 11 (right), with convex collection costs, the IR does not remanufacture for
α>0.6 (0.5) for η=0.3 (0.7), under constant discount factors. The convex collection cost structure
makes it less attractive for the IR to remanufacture. Under variable discount factors, however,
Figures 6 and 11 indicate that the IR always remanufacture in this example. Again, variable
discount factors make remanufacturing more attractive, which is in line with the insights from
section 6.1, obtained without convex collection costs. Finally, Figure 12 confirms that, as the
unit relative remanufacturing cost α increases, the OEM’s profit increases, whereas the IR’s profit
decreases, under both constant and variable discount factors. In sum, the overal robustness of the
constant discount factor model is confirmed under convex collection costs, for both monopoly and
competition.
7.2. Extended competition: Remanufacturing by both OEM and IR
In this section, we extend our base competition model to also allow the OEM to remanufacture
its own product and thus compete with the IR for remanufactured products. Given its analytical
difficulty, this case has only been numerically analyzed by Örsdemir et al. (2014) under constant
discount factors. In terms of notation in this section, the only change with respect to Table 1 is
that the subscript r now refers to the remanufactured product by the OEM, whereas the subscript i
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now refers to the remanufactured product by the IR. So, for example, pi is the IR’s remanufactured
product’s price. There is also a new parameter to differentiate consumer’s WTP for the IR’s
remanufactured product relative to the OEM’s, as we discuss next.
7.2.1. Demand functions
As before, a consumer of type (θ, δ) has a WTP for the new product θ, and has a WTP
for the OEM’s remanufactured product δθ. That same consumer type, however, has a WTP
for the IR’s remanufactured product equal to γθδ, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to be constant
across consumers. We thus assume that there is heterogeneity in WTP in consumers towards
remanufactured products in general (given by δ), as before, and that remanufacturing by an IR
implies an additional fixed discount on their WTP for remanufactured products. There is some
empirical support for consumers preferring products remanufactured by an OEM as opposed to
an IR. For example, Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012) show that remanufactured products
sold by an OEM-authorized reseller command higher average prices than products remanufactured
by an IR. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no empirically-derived distribution of
discount factors for both OEM and IRs, hence our simplifying assumption that γ is constant across
consumers. This assumption also ensures some tractability in deriving demand curves as follows.
A consumer of type (θ, δ) derives net utilities Un=θs−pn from a new product, Ur=δθs−pr from
an OEM’s remanufactured product, Ui = γδθs−pi from an IR’s remnuanufactured product, and
Uz = 0 from buying nothing. Similarly to section 3.2, equating the net utilities from each pair of
alternatives yields indifference curves (now six, as opposed to three): θrn= pn−pr(1−δ)s , θzr=
pr
δs , θzn=
pn
s ,
θin=
pn−pi
(1−γδ)s , θir=
pr−pi
(1−γ)δs , and θzi=
pi
γδs .
Demand functions under constant discount factors δ. First, consider the case where δ is constant
across consumers. A consumer purchases a new product if θ>max
{
pn−pr
(1−δ)s ,
pn
s ,
pn−pi
(1−γδ)s
}
, the OEM’s
remanufactured product if max
{
pr
δs ,
pr−pi
(1−γ)δs
}
< θ < pn−pr(1−δ)s , the IR’s remanufactured product if
pi
γδs <θ<min
{
pn−pi
(1−γδ)s ,
pr−pi
(1−γ)δs
}
, and nothing if θ <min
{
pr
δs ,
pn
s ,
pi
γδs
}
. An algebraic manipulation,
similar to what was used to derive (1), results in the demand functions, which are omitted for
brevity (details available upon request).
Demand functions under variable discount factors δ. Now, consider the case where δ is variable
across consumers. Figure 13 graphically depicts the consumer regions for buying new products
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Figure 13: Consumer behavior in the extended competition case depending in θ and δ (γ = 0.8, s = 1, pn = 0.6,
pr = 0.4, pi = 0.3)
Table 6: The values of a-k in Figure 13.
a = θzn(0) =
pn
s d = θir(1) =
pr−pi
(1−γ)s g =
pi
γpn
j = pns +
γpr−pi
(1−γ)s
b = θin(0) =
pn−pi
s e = θzr(1) =
pr
s h = pr/pn k = 1− pn−prs
c = θrn(0) =
pn−pr
s f = θzi(1) =
pi
γs i =
pr−pi
(1−γ)pn+γpr−pi
(N), buying remanufactured products from the OEM (R) and the IR (I), and not buying (Z) in
the plane (θ, δ). The values of a-k in Figure 13 are given in Table 6.
Under reasonable assumptions (pn>pr>pi) it holds that a>b>c. Further on, if pi≥γpr then
d ≤ f , the IR does not remanufacture (qi = 0), and demand functions (7)-(8) apply (Case 1). If
pi<γpr it holds that d> e> f , g < h< i< k, and j > a (all functions and intersection points are
ordered as in Figure 13) and the IR does remanufacture (Case 2). In Case 2, demand functions
(using abbreviations from Table 6) become:
qn(pn, pr, pi, s) =
∫ g
0
f(δ) dδ
∫ 1
a
dθ +
∫ i
g
f(δ)
∫ 1
θin
dθ dδ +
∫ k
i
f(δ)
∫ 1
θrn
dθ dδ, (9)
qr(pn, pr, pi, s) =
∫ 1
i
f(δ)
∫ 1
θir
dθ dδ −
∫ k
i
f(δ)
∫ 1
θrn
dθ dδ, (10)
qi(pn, pr, pi, s) =
∫ i
g
f(δ)
∫ θin
θzi
dθ dδ +
∫ 1
i
f(δ)
∫ θir
θzi
dθ dδ. (11)
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Again, we assume the supports of θ and δ to be in the range [0,1], or else truncated accordingly.
To model the strength of each party in core collection, we add a new parameter ρ to represent
the fraction of total cores that are available to the OEM, so that 1−ρ is the fraction available to the
IR. That is, qr(pn, pr, pi, s) ≤ ρqn(pn, pr, pi, s), and qi(pn, pr, pi, s) ≤ (1 − ρ)qn(pn, pr, pi, s). Thus,
if ρ > 0.5 (ρ < 0.5), the OEM (IR) has an advantage in core collection. The game to be solved
is similar to the game stated in (4)-(6), except that the demand functions are given by (9)-(11),
the OEM’s profit function has an additional term to represent its net revenues from selling its
remanufactured product qr(pr − αβs2), subject to its core availability constraint qr ≤ ρqn; finally,
the IR’s profit function is the net revenues from selling its remanufactured product qi(pi − αβs2)
subject to its core availability constraint qi ≤ (1−ρ)qn. Here, we make the assumption, for simplicity
of presentation and space purposes, that both OEM and IR have the same remanufacturing costs.
Numerical solution approach and experimental design. Under either constant or variable discount
factors, the model needs to be solved numerically by a procedure similar to that described in section
4, with the additional complication that now the second-stage game between the OEM and IR has
an additional decision variable for the OEM, pr. This significantly increases computational time,
as the search space for an equilibrium is now three-dimensional, as opposed to two-dimensional. In
terms of experimental design, we use the same parameter values described in section 4, with the
addition of two new parameters, γ, and ρ. For γ, we consider low and high values γ ∈ {0.6, 0.9};
the low value of γ = 0.6 represents a case of weak competition (values of γ lower than 0.6 are
not interesting as the IR is not able to compete with the OEM), whereas the high value γ = 0.9
represents the case of a stronger IR. For the core availability parameter ρ, we consider three levels
to represent scenarios where the OEM (IR) has an advantage in core collection ρ = 23 (ρ =
1
3), and
where the OEM and IR are in equal position (ρ = 12).
7.2.2. Results
Similarly to Figures 5, 6, and 7 from section 6.1, we use a representative case to illustrate the
difference between equilibria for constant discount factors (superscript “F”) and variable discount
factors (superscript “opt”). They are shown in Figure 14 for the equilibrium prices pn, pr, and
pi, and in Figure 15 for the equilibrium quality level s, and profits, respectively. OEM’s (IR’s)
variables are shown in bold (regular) lines. Figure 14 (left) shows that both constant and variable
25
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
α
pn
p
opt
n p
F
n
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
α
pr , pi
p
opt
r p
opt
i
pFr p
F
i
Figure 14: Impact of α on optimal prices pn (left) and pr and pi (right) in the extended competition case (E[δ] = 0.6,
CV= 1
3
, γ = 0.6, and ρ = 1
3
)
discount factor models predict that α has little impact on new product prices, except when there
is a change in the equilibrium region (from total to partial remanufacturing as α increases).
Figure 14 (right) shows that both constant and variable discount factor models predict that
remanufactured product prices typically increase in α, with a potential decrease when there is a
change from total to partial remanufacturing. Both constant and variable discount factor models
also predict that the IR stops remanufacturing at a lower value of α than the OEM, due to valuation
disadvantage γ < 1 in the eyes of consumers. Finally, in line with all previous findings, remanu-
facturing is more attractive under a wider range of α values under variable than under constant
discount factors. Figure 15 (right) shows that the IR’s profit decreases monotonically in α under
both constant and variable discount factor models. Both constant and variable discount factor
models also predict that the OEM’s profit may increase in α at high enough values of α when the
IR is being driven out of the market. In sum, the constant discount factor model demonstrates its
reasonable robustness in this extended competition case as well.
Considering that the full analysis of such an extended competition model is beyond the scope
of this paper (as our objective is to compare constant and variable discount factor solutions), we
provide a quick analysis of the most impactful parameter values on this extended competition model
through regression analyses as follows. We consider a restricted set of results from our experimental
design, where we only have low and high values of each parameter: E[δ] ∈ {0.3, 0.6}, CV ∈ {16 , 13},
γ ∈ {0.6, 0.9}, ρ ∈ {13 , 23}, and α ∈ {0.3, 0.7}. This results in 32 different experimental cells in a
full-factorial fashion, with solutions for both constant and variable discount factors. We then run
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Figure 15: Impact of α on optimal quality level s (left) and piOEM and piIR (right) in the extended competition case
(E[δ] = 0.6, CV= 1
3
, γ = 0.6, and ρ = 1
3
)
six different regressions, where in each regression the dependent variable is a particular equilibrium
value of the variable discount factor model (e.g., sopt∗), and the independent variables are the five
parameters E[δ], CV, γ, ρ, and α. Despite the small sample size, the relative magnitude of the
t-statistics for the respective regression coefficients in this high-low experimental design provides
a measure of that variable’s impact on the dependent variable (Wagner, 1980). Although a larger
sample size may improve the accuracy of the regression coefficients (Kelley and Maxwell, 2003),
our objective here is not to estimate the regression coefficients. Rather, our focus is on the relative
impact of each parameter on the variable of interest, which is captured by the magnitude of a
coefficient’s t-statistic (not the coefficient itself) relative to those of other parameters, considering
the simple high-low experimental design (Wagner, 1980). Likewise, we conduct five additional
regressions where the dependent variables are now the the difference between constant and variable
discount factor solutions as defined in section 5.2 (e.g., ∆s∗ = 100% · sF∗−sopt∗sopt∗ is a dependent
variable in a regression). We do not conduct a regression for ∆Π∗IR, as in some cases Π
F
IR = 0,
which renders ∆Π∗IR meaningless. The results are displayed in Table 7, where t-values for the
intercepts are not displayed.
For sopt∗, the most impactful parameter is E[δ] (t-value = 1.61), although the impact is not
significant at p < 0.1 in this restricted 32-cell design, because the variation in equilibrium values of
sopt∗ is small across the design. For popt∗n , the most significant (negative) impact is from γ (t-value
= -2.28), as a stronger IR (higher γ) means that the OEM must reduce its new product price
to better compete with the IR. For popt∗r , the most significant impact is from E(δ) (t-value =7,
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Table 7: Values of t-statistics for variable coefficients in regressions (one regression per column)
Variable sopt∗ popt∗n popt∗r p
opt∗
i pi
opt∗
OEM pi
opt∗
IR ∆s
∗(%) ∆p∗n(%) ∆p∗r(%) ∆p∗i (%) ∆Π∗OEM (%)
E[δ] 1.61 0.20 7.00** 5.48** -4.04** 4.01** 0.69 0.47 1.60 2.11** -2.80**
CV 1.00 1.14 1.96* 1.26 -0.49 0.55 -0.39 -0.42 -0.96 -0.68 -1.35
γ -1.17 -2.28** -4.92** 1.49 -4.77** 1.87* 0.73 0.83 2.22** 1.66 -1.00
ρ -1.00 -0.54 -0.86 -0.37 2.52** -1.35 2.04* 2.20** 2.16** 2.28** 2.25**
α -1.35 -0.44 4.58** 4.70** 1.23 -3.64** 0.88 0.88 -0.90 -0.77 5.28**
[*] p<0.1; [**] p<0.05
positive as a larger expected WTP means a larger price), followed by γ (t-value = -4.92), then
α (t-value = 4.58), and CV (t-value = 1.96, positive as a larger CV means the OEM can price
the remanufactured product higher, in line with the results of section 5.1). For popt∗i , the most
significant impact is again from E(δ) (t-value=5.48), followed by α (t-value = 4.70, again positive
as a larger cost means a larger price). The OEM’s profit piopt∗OEM has its highest (negative) impact
from γ (t-value = -4.77), followed by E(δ) (t-value=-4.04), ρ (t-value = 2.52, positive as a higher
ρ means a higher availability of cores for the OEM). The IR’s profit, on the other hand, is mostly
(negatively) impacted by E(δ) (t-value=4.01), followed by α (t-value = -3.64), γ (t-value = 1.87,
as a higher WTP for IR remanufactured products increases IR profit). In terms of the deviations
∆ of the equilibrium values between constant and variable discount factors, the most impactful
parameter is ρ, which has a high positive t-value in all five regressions; this means that a higher
value of ρ increases the deviation between constant and variable discount factor equilibrium values.
All other parameters do not explain the differences, except for γ in ∆p∗r , and α in ∆Π∗OEM . In
these cases, a higher γ (α) means a relative higher remanufactured product price (OEM’s profit)
forecasted by the constant discount factor model compared to the variable discount factor model.
8. Conclusion
This paper has studied the robustness of the constant discount factor assumption for reman-
ufactured products—an assumption widely used in the prescriptive CLSC literature, particularly
in strategic-level, stylized models—considering recent empirical challenges to it. In particular, we
take as an input the approximately normal probability distribution of discount factors empirically
derived by Abbey et al. (2017) for the iPhone 6, and use it in what is arguably the most complex
stylized models in the CLSC literature: quality choice with remanufacturing, under monopoly and
competitive settings. This problem has been studied by Atasu and Souza (2013) and Örsdemir
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et al. (2014) under constant discount factors. We also provide two significant extensions: convex
collection costs, and an extended competition case, where both OEM and IR can offer remanufac-
tured products, in addition to new products by the OEM. The quality choice model with variable
discount factors is intractable and must be solved numerically.
Overall, we find reasonable consistency in the results between the variable and constant discount
factor models, for both monopoly and competitive cases. We believe this paper makes a convincing
argument that the constant discount factor assumption is appropriate for use in stylized strategic
models involving remanufacturing. The variable discount factor model brings additional insights:
(i) the remanufacturing firm optimally prices the remanufactured product higher than the price
suggested under constant discount factors; (ii) a higher variability in the distribution of discount
factors makes remanufacturing more attractive in a wider cost range, as a larger variability implies
that there is a larger fraction of customers with WTP higher than the mean; and consequently (iii)
profits are higher for the remanufacturing firm when the variability in discount factors is higher.
References
Abbey, J. D., Kleber, R., Souza, G. C., and Voigt, G. (2017). The role of perceived quality risk in pricing remanu-
factured products. Production and Operations Management, 26(1):100–115.
Abbey, J. D., Meloy, M., V. Daniel Guide, J., and Atalay, S. (2015). Remanufactured products in closed-loop supply
chains for consumer goods. Production and Operations Management, 24(3):488–503.
Agrawal, V., Atasu, A., and Ittersum, K. V. (2015). Remanufacturing, third-party competition, and consumers’
perceived value of new products. Management Science, 61(1):60–72.
Atasu, A., Sarvary, M., and van Wassenhove, L. (2008). Remanufacturing as a marketing strategy. Management
Science, 47(8):1081–1100.
Atasu, A. and Souza, G. C. (2013). How does product recovery affect quality choice? Production and Operations
Management, 22(4):991–1010.
Atasu, A., Toktay, L. B., and Wassenhove, L. V. (2013). How collection cost structure drives a manufacturer’s reverse
channel choice. Production and Operations Management, 22(5):1089–1102.
Atasu, A., V. Daniel Guide, J., and Van Wassenhove, L. (2010). So what if remanufacturing cannibalizes my new
product sales? California Management Review, 52(2):56–76.
Belleflamme, P. and Peitz, M. (2015). Industrial Organization. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, second
edition.
Debo, L. G., Toktay, L. B., and Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2005). Market segmentation and product technology
selection for remanufacturable products. Management Science, 51(8):1193–1205.
29
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Ferguson, M. and Souza, G. C. (2010). Closed-Loop Supply Chains: New Developments to Improve the Sustainability
of Business Practices. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
Ferguson, M. E. and Toktay, L. B. (2006). The effect of competition on recovery strategies. Production and Operations
Management, 15(3):351–368.
Ferrer, G. and Swaminathan, J. M. (2006). Managing new and remanufactured products. Management Science,
52(1):15–26.
Galbreth, M. R., Boyaci, T., and Verter, V. (2013). Product reuse in innovative industries. Production and Operations
Management, 22(4):1011–1033.
Guide, Jr., V. D. R., , Teunter, R. H., and Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2003). Matching demand and supply to maximize
profits from remanufacturing. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 5(4):303–316.
Guide, Jr., V. D. R. and Li, K. (2010). The potential for cannibalization of new product sales by remanufactured
products. Decision Sciences, 41(3):547–572.
Hauser, W. and Lund, R. T. (2003). The Remanufacturing Industry: Anatomy of a Giant. Boston University, Boston,
MA.
Kelley, K. and Maxwell, S. (2003). Sample size for multiple regression: obtaining regression coefficients that are
accurate, not simply significant. Psychological Methods, 6(3):305–321.
Lund, R. T. (1984). Remanufacturing. Technology Review, 87(2):19–27.
Majumder, P. and Groenevelt, H. (2001). Competition in remanufacturing. Production and Operations Management,
10(2):125–141.
Moorthy, K. S. (1988). Product and price competition in a duopoly. Marketing Science, 7(2):141–165.
Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18(2):301–317.
Oraiopoulos, N., Ferguson, M., and Toktay, L. B. (2012). Relicensing as a secondary market strategy. Management
Science, 58(5):1022–1037.
Örsdemir, A., Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya, E., and Parlaktürk, A. K. (2014). Competitive quality choice and remanufacturing.
Production and Operations Management, 23(1):48–64.
Ovchinnikov, A. (2011). Revenue and cost management for remanufactured products. Production and Operations
Management, 20(6):824–840.
Ovchinnikov, A., Blass, V., and Raz, G. (2014). Economic and environmental assessment of remanufacturing strate-
gies for product + service firms. Production and Operations Management, 23(5):744–761.
Souza, G. C. (2013). Closed-loop supply chains: A critical review, and future research. Decision Sciences, 44(1):7–38.
Subramanian, R., Ferguson, M., and Toktay, L. B. (2013). Remanufacturing and the component commonality
decision. Production and Operations Management, 22(1):36–53.
Subramanian, R. and Subramanyam, R. (2012). Key factors in the market for remanufactured products. Manufac-
turing & Service Operations Management, 15(2):315–326.
Vorasayan, J. and Ryan, S. M. (2006). Optimal price and quantity of refurbished products. Production and Operations
Management, 15(3):269–383.
Wagner, H. M. (1980). Global sensitivity analysis. Operations Research, 43(6):948–969.
30
